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Abstract 
 
The vast majority of low-income, high-achieving high school students in the U.S. either do not 
apply to college or undermatch by attending less selective institutions than those they are 
qualified to attend. Previous research has demonstrated that behavioral “nudges” can be an 
effective and low-cost method of influencing students’ application behavior and encouraging 
them to enroll in selective institutions. This study contributes to this existing body of literature 
by examining whether framing college earnings premium information as a loss causes low-
income high school students in Chicago to report greater likelihood of applying to college than 
when the same information is framed as a gain. I find that there are no significant differences 
between the gain and loss conditions, but that students in both conditions report greater 
likelihood of applying to a highly selective college as compared to students in the control, where 
no earnings premium information was provided. 
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Inequality in Educational Attainment and Income in the U.S. 
 Inequality in educational attainment between the rich and poor is at an all-time high in 
the United States. As Putnam (2015) observes, “In the twenty-first century, socioeconomic status 
has become even more important than test scores in predicting whether a student will graduate 
from college.” For the first time in U.S. history, high-scoring low-income students are now 
slightly less likely (29 percent) to get a college degree than low-scoring high-income students 
(30 percent). Furthermore, Bailey and Dynarski (2011) find that the college attainment gap has 
been widening rapidly since the 1980s. Whereas 58 percent of students from the most affluent 
quintile and 19 percent from the poorest quintile entered college in 1980, 80 percent of high-
income students now enter as opposed to only 29 percent of low-income students. 
 Just as inequality in educational attainment has risen during this period, so too has 
income inequality in the U.S. (Piketty, 2014). Goldin and Katz (2010) argue that this is not a 
coincidence. During the first eight decades of the twentieth century, the supply of educated 
workers was higher than the demand for them. This led to higher incomes for most people and 
lower inequality. Since about 1980, however, the rate of technological change has increased, 
demand for educated workers has outpaced the supply, and the result has been rising income 
inequality. While this paints a bleak picture, there is perhaps a silver lining. If educational 
attainment and income inequality are truly as interrelated as Goldin and Katz claim, then 
improving opportunities for low-income students to access education may, in turn, reduce 
income inequality. Before discussing strategies to improve access, though, it is worth briefly 
explaining some of the private returns to higher education. 
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Returns to Higher Education 
Perhaps the most salient benefit of having a college degree is an increase in earnings. 
Median annual earnings of bachelor’s degree recipients are approximately $21,100 higher than 
those of high school graduates. Median lifetime earnings of those who attend college are 65 
percent higher than those of their counterparts who only attend high school (Baum, Ma & Payea, 
2013). The earnings premium associated with going to college has been increasing over time, 
too. Between 1980 and 2008, the earnings differential between college and high school graduates 
increased dramatically from 50 percent to 95 percent (Autor, 2010). In general, ample evidence 
points to the fact that college is a worthwhile investment in one’s future. Leslie and Brinkman 
(1988) further calculate that the private rate of return on an undergraduate degree is between 11.8 
and 13.4 percent, and that even this estimate is understated because many students receive 
financial aid and/or grants that offset the cost of college. 
While the earnings differential between high school and college graduates is large, the 
gap is significantly larger for those who attend selective institutions. Even after controlling for 
selection effects, there is strong evidence that attending an elite private institution provides a 
significant earnings premium over attending a less selective institution (Brewer, Eide & 
Ehrenberg, 1999; Hoxby, 2001). This effect is most pronounced for students who come from 
low-income backgrounds (Dale & Krueger, 1999).  
In light of this, combined with the evidence presented in the previous section, it seems 
apparent that policymakers should pay particular attention to ensuring that low-income, high-
achieving students have equal opportunities to access higher education as compared with their 
higher-income peers. This not only aligns with our belief in America as a land of opportunity 
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where meritocracy prevails; it also has the potential to reduce income inequality, arguably the 
nation’s most critical domestic concern. 
 
Low-Income, High-Achieving Students 
 Hoxby and Avery (2013) show that the vast majority of low-income, high-achieving 
students in the U.S. do not apply to selective colleges, despite the fact that selective institutions 
typically cost less and have higher institutional graduation rates than less selective colleges. This 
application behavior may subsequently lead to academic undermatch, which occurs when a 
student enrolls in a less selective institution than one which he is qualified to attend. 
While students across the socioeconomic status (SES) spectrum are susceptible to 
undermatch, low-income students are especially vulnerable. Students below the median SES 
level in the U.S. undermatch 49.6 percent of the time, whereas those above the median SES 
undermatch only 34 percent of the time. The degree of undermatching is also quite large; 22.7 
percent of lower-SES students enroll in a college that is two selectivity levels below what they 
could have attended (Smith, Pender & Howell, 2012). 
Solving the problem of undermatch is an important goal for policymakers, and for good 
reason. Every year, there are roughly 30,000 low-income, high-achieving students (where “high-
achieving” includes those who score in the top 10 percent nationally on the SAT or ACT), which 
means that highly selective colleges could theoretically increase the proportion of low-income 
students on their campuses by 30 percent without lowering admissions standards (Giancola & 
Kahlenberg, 2016). The goal of this paper is to examine the ways that the field of behavioral 
economics can be used to solve the problem of undermatch, as well as to improve college access 
for low-income students more generally. 
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Why Nudge? 
 A nudge, as Sunstein and Thaler (2009) define it, is “any aspect of choice architecture 
that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives.” Two aspects of nudging are intuitively appealing from a 
policymaking perspective. First, nudges are typically cheap to implement. Unlike programs like 
QuestBridge or Posse, which spend lots of money and resources to help low-income students 
apply to college, nudges operate through simple reminders and reframing of information, among 
countless other ways. Second, nudges embrace the concept of libertarian paternalism. They are 
libertarian in the sense that they preserve people’s freedom to choose. They are simultaneously 
paternalistic in the sense that they enable policymakers (or high schools, or colleges, or any other 
choice architect) to make decisions about what they think will make the chooser’s life better 
(Sunstein & Thaler, 2009). 
 The next section provides a review of just some of the ways that nudges have been 
implemented in the world of education and college access. 
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Review of Information- and Assistance-Based Interventions 
Information-Based Interventions 
Expanding College Opportunities Project 
 Hoxby and Avery (2013) show that the vast majority of low-income, high-achieving 
students do not apply to any selective colleges despite being qualified for admission and success 
at these institutions. In a landmark study, Hoxby and Turner (2013) build on this research by 
designing a set of interventions known as the Expanding College Opportunities (ECO) Project. 
Roughly 40,000 low-income, high-achieving students across the U.S. were randomly assigned to 
receive different types of information. The most comprehensive form of the intervention, called 
the Expanding College Opportunities-Comprehensive (ECO-C) Intervention, provided students 
with application guidance, semi-customized information about the net cost of attending different 
colleges, and no-paperwork application fee waivers, all for only $6 per student contacted. 
 Hoxby and Turner found that the ECO-C Intervention had a large effect on these 
students’ college application and enrollment behavior. Students in this condition submitted 48 
percent more applications, were 78 percent more likely to be admitted to a peer college, and were 
46 more likely to enroll in a peer college. To date, the ECO Project is the most important study 
showing that the provision of high quality and relevant information about college options to low-
income, high-achieving students can have a significant impact on their behavior. 
 
Effects of Test Score Information 
There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that low-income, high-achieving 
students underestimate their competitiveness in the pool of college applicants due to a lack of 
information about their qualifications. Sitting for a college entrance exam, for example, is an 
important step in the application process and poses a nontrivial barrier for many students. 
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Goodman (2012) shows that, in Colorado and Illinois, selective college enrollment increased by 
about 20 percent after statewide test-taking mandates were implemented. A plausible explanation 
for this is that students may be pleasantly surprised by their scores, which, in turn, may convince 
them to apply to and enroll in college. This finding points towards the fact that simply providing 
students with more information about their academic qualifications can potentially increase their 
likelihood of applying to selective institutions. 
Similarly, Bulman (2012) analyzes data from every SAT and ACT testing facility across 
the U.S. and finds that students are more likely to attend college if they attend a high school that 
hosts a test center. The explanation for this is twofold. First, students who attend high schools 
that double as testing facilities likely have increased awareness about exam dates and receive 
implicit recommendations from faculty and administrators to take the exam. Second, as in 
Goodman (2012), taking the test may reveal surprisingly encouraging information to students 
about their qualifications and may subsequently lead them to apply to college. 
 
Effects of Applying on Enrollment Behavior 
 In addition to these encouraging findings about the provision of information related to 
academic qualifications, Smith (2013) finds that the act of applying to colleges in and of itself 
increases students’ likelihood of enrollment. This effect, however, is most pronounced for 
students applying to very few colleges. Moving from one to two applications and two to three 
applications increases students’ odds of enrolling by 40 percent and 10 percent, respectively 
(with additionally diminishing probabilities as the number of applications increases). This 
finding is partly explained by the fact that students who apply to more colleges are likely to be 
accepted to more, but it is also explained by the mindset that applying to college creates. 
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 At San Marcos High School in Texas, administrators started requiring that students 
complete an application to nearby Austin Community College in order to graduate. Because all it 
takes to be admitted to the community college is a completed application and a record of having 
taken the SAT or ACT, filling out the application was equivalent to being accepted. The 
requirement of completing an application, combined with a few other nudges, increased the 
number of San Marcos High students enrolling in Texas colleges by 11 percent (Sunstein & 
Thaler, 2009). This result corroborates the findings of Smith (2013), namely that the mere act of 
applying and being accepted to college may change the way students perceive their qualifications 
as well as the value of higher education. 
 Finally, Pallais (2015) shows that when the ACT increased the number of free score 
reports that students could send from three to four, more college applications were completed 
and low-income ACT-takers in particular attended more selective colleges as a result. As in the 
previous studies mentioned, this finding shows that the provision of test score information may 
be especially worthwhile for low-income students. Additionally, the fact that the marginal cost of 
sending a fourth score report was just $6 before the policy was changed also highlights the 
possibility that students rely heavily on simple heuristics (i.e., the number of free score reports) 
when making college application decisions. While this is concerning in some sense, it is also 
encouraging in the sense that it shows that the college application process is littered with various 
cognitive biases that are relatively easy to overcome through the use of nudging. 
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Assistance-Based Interventions 
Simplifying the Financial Aid Process 
 A substantial body of research shows that the application process for federal financial aid 
is highly complex, and that students and families especially from low-income backgrounds have 
difficulty navigating it (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2006). The authors write, “The federal 
system for distributing financial aid rivals the tax code in its complexity.” In order to complete 
the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), one must answer more than a hundred 
detailed financial questions that require tax forms and other sources. The negative consequences 
of this complexity are significant. Low-income students may fall behind on application deadlines 
as a result or even be deterred from matriculating into college altogether (Avery & Kane, 2004). 
 Several efforts have been made to simplify the process of applying for financial aid. 
While some of these efforts focus on reducing the complexity of forms themselves (e.g., 
Dynarski & Wiederspan, 2012), the most noteworthy study involves providing direct personal 
assistance to low-income families completing the FAFSA (Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos & 
Sanbonmatsu, 2012). Working with H&R Block, the researchers provided parents with personal 
assistance in filling out the forms, as well as information about estimated financial aid packages. 
Students whose parents received the treatment were more likely to apply for financial aid, 
receive larger aid packages, and enroll in college. Furthermore, families who received aid 
information but no assistance with the FAFSA did not experience improved outcomes. 
 These findings suggest that, while the provision of information may reduce barriers to 
college access for low-income students in some cases, information alone is not enough. In many 
cases, individual-specific support and assistance is likely to produce the largest effects. 
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Using Text Messages as Prompts 
 In recent years, increased attention has been paid to the effectiveness of text messages as 
a means of communicating information to high school and college students. In one study, 
Castleman and Page (2014) sent text reminders to college freshmen with information on how to 
renew their FAFSA, an important step that students must take in order to retain their financial 
aid. The authors found that the prompts greatly improved the odds of freshmen at community 
colleges persisting into their sophomore year. By contrast, the texts did not improve persistence 
among freshmen at four-year colleges, where the rate of persistence was already high. 
 In a related study, Castleman and Page (2013) attempt to mitigate the effects of “summer 
melt,” whereby high school graduates who intend to go to college ultimately do not matriculate 
anywhere after high school. Over the summer, they sent personalized text messages to students 
with reminders about important tasks to complete. They found that these substantially increased 
college enrollment, especially among students with less access to quality college counseling. 
 Text messages are not just effective when communicating with students, either. Kraft and 
Rogers (2015) demonstrate that they can also be used as a method for teachers to communicate 
with parents. In fact, when parents of high school students received weekly, individualized text 
messages about their child’s academic performance, the proportion of students failing to receive 
course credit fell by 41 percent. In other words, the text messages enabled parents to keep better 
track of their child’s weekly progress and, as a result, students’ academic success increased. 
 While text messages are likely not the only answer to the question of how to provide 
students with personalized assistance, they are nonetheless an effective tool because of the 
ubiquity of cellphones, especially among young people, and the low cost of intervention. 
Individualized College Coaching 
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 The clearest and most traditional example of an assistance-based intervention is college 
coaching. Barr and Castleman (2016) conducted a long-term randomized controlled evaluation of 
Bottom Line, an intensive college advising program in Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois, 
and found that the program had a significant impact on the way that students approached the 
college application process. Students receiving Bottom Line coaching applied to substantially 
more colleges and were approximately 30 percent more likely to have reviewed their financial 
aid options with a professional. Most importantly, students in the Bottom Line program were 14 
percent more likely to enroll in a four-year college. They also attended more selective colleges 
with higher institutional graduation rates. 
Similarly, Carrell and Sacerdote (2012) test whether college counseling combined with 
cash incentives provided to high school students late in their senior year can improve college 
going and persistence. They find mixed results. First, offering cash incentives alone without 
coaching has no effect on the college going rate. Second, the program had pronounced effects for 
women and immigrant students, but smaller effects for non-immigrant men. The most important 
contribution of the study to the existing body of literature is that college coaching can have a 
positive impact on high school students who, late in their senior year, are “at the margin” of 
whether to enroll in college. 
 While most college coaching programs are focused on the application process, coaching 
can also be an effective tool to improve college persistence. Bettinger and Baker (2014) test the 
effectiveness of InsideTrack, a student coaching service that checks in regularly with non-
traditional college students to ensure that they are following through on their goals and building 
practical skills. They find that students who were randomly assigned to receive coaching from 
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InsideTrack were more likely to persist in college during the treatment period, and most 
encouragingly, more likely to still be enrolled one year after the coaching program ended. 
 Research findings on the effects of college coaching programs are important, yet this 
cannot be the only answer. Providing direct coaching is, among other things, more expensive on 
a per-student basis and less scalable due to a scarcity of qualified college counselors. Moreover, 
it is also not clear that college coaching qualifies as a “nudge” per se according to the definition 
given by Sunstein and Thaler (2009).  Whereas a nudge operates purely on the psychological 
level by altering the choice architecture governing certain decision making processes, college 
coaching resembles more of a “push” towards higher education. 
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Loss Aversion and Loss Framing 
Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present an alternative model to expected utility theory as 
a descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty, known as prospect theory. According 
to this theory of choice, value is assigned to gains and losses relative to a neutral reference point 
rather than to absolute utility levels. Kahneman and Tversky demonstrate using empirical 
evidence that the value function is typically concave for gains, convex for losses, and is 
generally steeper for losses than for gains (see Figure 1 below). 
 
Figure 1: Prospect Theory Value Function 
 
 
Loss Aversion 
Prospect theory as described above suggests an additional concept known as loss aversion 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). The central assumption of this theory is that, because the value 
function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain, losses and disadvantages have 
greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages. In other words, losses loom larger than 
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corresponding gains. The difference is not insignificant, either. Thaler (2015) estimates that 
losses hurt roughly twice as much as equivalent gains feel good. 
This finding is corroborated by evidence in neuroscience and psychology. Kahneman 
(2011) shows that the amygdala, the area of the brain responsible for threat detection and which 
is commonly associated with emotional arousal, is strongly activated when subjects are 
confronted with losses. In an influential paper titled “Bad Is Stronger Than Good,” Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs (2001) write, “Bad emotions and bad feedback have more 
impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly than the good.” 
The general conclusion here is that loss aversion is a highly powerful and motivating 
force in decision making. Dozens of studies have demonstrated its effects, typically by way of 
two phenomena known as the endowment effect and loss framing. 
 
Endowment Effect 
 Thaler (1980) explains the endowment effect as the following: “The loss of utility 
associated with giving up a valued good is greater than the utility gain associated with receiving 
it.” In one experiment, coffee mugs are randomly given to half the subjects in an experiment. A 
market is then created in which subjects with mugs are told to assign an ask price, and subjects 
without mugs are told to assign a bid price. Whereas subjects who were not initially given a mug 
valued it at a median price of $3.12, those who were given a mug (i.e., endowment) valued it at 
$7.12. This discrepancy confirms the theory of loss aversion insofar as a perceived loss “hurt” 
the subjects with a mug more than an equivalent perceived gain “felt good” for the subjects 
without one. Subjects with a mug feared that giving it up would hurt a lot, while subjects without 
a mug felt that receiving one would feel only pretty good (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991). 
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Several studies have shown similar effects in natural field experiments. In one study, 
Houssain and List (2012) show that bonuses framed as losses improved worker productivity at a 
Chinese factory as compared to bonuses framed as gains. In the positively-framed bonus 
(“reward”) condition, workers were told that if the week’s per-hour production reached a certain 
threshold, a bonus would be paid at the end of the pay period. In the negatively-framed bonus 
(“punishment”) treatment, workers were provisionally given the bonus before the work week 
began, but were told that if the week’s per-hour production did not reach a certain threshold, the 
bonus would be retracted at the end of the pay period. While the value of the bonus issued was 
equivalent in both groups, the endowment effect was significant. Worker productivity increased 
by a statistically significant amount when moving from the reward to the punishment treatment.  
Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2012) likewise show that teacher bonuses framed as losses 
are linked to stronger student outcomes than bonuses framed as gains. When teachers were paid 
in advance and asked to give back the money if their students did not improve sufficiently, math 
test scores increased by approximately one-third of a standard deviation. As Fryer et al. note, this 
is equivalent to increasing teacher quality by more than one standard deviation. 
Similar findings are observed when loss-framed financial incentives are used to 
encourage academic performance among high school students in several Chicago schools (Levitt, 
List, Neckermann & Sadoff, 2012). In this study, students either received $20 cash after a 
standardized testing session if they improved (gain frame), or received $20 before the testing 
session and were told that they would keep the reward if they improved and lose it if they did not 
improve (loss frame). The researchers found that the loss-framed incentives were more likely to 
produce testing improvements than the gain-framed incentives. 
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Loss Framing 
 Loss aversion, however, does not only manifest itself in the form of the endowment 
effect. A sizable literature (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) highlights 
the powerful effects of a strongly related concept known as loss framing. Whereas the 
endowment effect is concerned with material gains and losses (i.e., payment is actually given or 
taken away), loss framing uses the power of language alone to influence decision processes.  
Ganzach and Karsahi (1995) demonstrate that loss framing in the context of consumer 
advertising is much more likely to increase consumer purchases than gain framing. Customers of 
a credit card company who rarely used their cards received a message explaining the benefits of 
the card. These benefits were explained either in terms of gains the customers could realize from 
using the card or in terms of losses they could suffer from not using it (see Figure 2 below). 
 
Figure 2: Credit Card Gain vs. Loss Framing (Ganzach & Karsahi, 1995) 
Gain Frame 
1. In using ZionCard you can only gain in comparison to using cash! 
2. There is no commission on using ZionCard! 
3. Using ZionCard does provide you with protection against theft or loss! 
 
Loss Frame 
1. In using cash you can only lose in comparison to using ZionCard! 
2. There is no commission on using ZionCard! 
3. Using cash does not provide you with protection against theft or loss! 
 
 
Card usage was then monitored for two months after the message. Results showed that 
the percentage of customers in the loss condition who started to use the card was more than 
double the percentage observed in the gain condition. The framing effect was not ephemeral, 
either. In a follow up questionnaire distributed six months later, 66 percent of respondents in the 
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loss condition could recall the message, as compared to only 43 percent in the gain condition. 
This suggests that loss framing may have durable, lasting effects as a cognitive nudge. 
This literature serves as the basic premise for leveraging the effects of loss framing to 
encourage more students to apply to college. To date, the financial benefits of attending college 
are almost exclusively communicated to high school students using gain framing (e.g., “College 
students earn more, on average, than those who do not attend college”). But the benefits of going 
to college can just as easily be framed as losses associated with not going to college. As far as we 
know, no studies have tested the effects of loss framing in this context. This concept forms the 
basis of the research study’s primary question as explained in the “Objectives and Methodology” 
section. 
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Perceptions of College Costs and Returns 
Present Bias 
Contrary to what standard models of time discounting predict, human beings have a 
tendency to overweight costs and benefits in the present relative to those in the future. This 
phenomenon is known as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, or more simply, present bias (Thaler, 
2015). Using their “beta-delta” model of intertemporal choice, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) 
show that decision makers who are susceptible to their present bias are more likely to 
procrastinate immediate-cost activities and preproperate (i.e., do to soon) immediate-reward 
activities. The consequences of the present bias cognitive bias are vast. It can be used as an 
explanation for behaviors ranging from smoking, to failing to save enough for retirement, to 
inaccurately weighing the costs and benefits of attending college (Madrian, 2014). 
 
Perceptions of College Costs 
 Research findings generally report that parents and students overestimate the cost of 
college tuition by a factor of two or more, and that estimates for community college tuition are 
more upwardly biased than estimates for four-year colleges. Moreover, cost estimates tend to be 
more biased among low-income and minority families relative to their higher-income, white 
counterparts (Avery & Kane, 2004; Ikenberry & Hartle, 1998). Grodsky and Jones (2007) 
similarly find that there are significant differences in perceptions of college costs stratified by 
race and social class. Black and hispanic parents are less likely than white parents to be able to 
accurately estimate tuition costs, as are less educated and lower income parents. Part of the 
problem, it seems, is that low-income and minority families have poor information when it 
comes to the costs of college. Given what we know about present bias, this may lead families to 
overestimate the present cost of attending college. 
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Perceptions of Returns to College 
 While parents and students tend to overestimate the costs of attending college, 
perceptions of the returns to a college degree are generally more accurate. Smith and Powell 
(1990) find that college seniors have fairly informed expectations of the earnings of other college 
graduates, although expectations about their own incomes were more skewed. Dominitz and 
Manski (1996) surveyed high school students and found that, even at a young age, there is a 
common belief that the returns to a college education are positive. Again, however, they find that 
students are rather uncertain about their own future earnings. 
 Avery and Kane (2004) contribute to the existing body of literature by showing that the 
wage expectations of low-income and higher-income high school students are not only 
surprisingly accurate, but that the two groups also have remarkably similar expectations to one 
another despite their different backgrounds. 
 It seems, therefore, that present bias does not actually prevent students from coming up 
with relatively accurate estimates of their expected returns to a college education. The bigger 
problem may be an information gap with respect to college costs. Regardless, the decisions of 
whether to apply to and attend college are presumably based on a weighing of the present costs 
against future benefits. This literature on perceived costs and benefits forms the basis of the 
research study’s secondary question as explained in the “Objectives and Methodology” section. 
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Objectives and Methodology 
Purpose 
Primary Purpose 
The primary purpose of this study is to determine whether framing the financial benefits 
of attending college (i.e., the earnings premium) as a loss is likely to induce students to self-
report a higher likelihood of applying to college than when those same benefits are framed as a 
gain. To clarify, the difference between framing benefits as a gain versus framing as a loss is a 
purely psychological phenomenon. As a substantive matter, the same exact information is 
provided in both frames. 
 For example, one can frame the earnings premium of attending college in terms of the 
gains one will experience as a result, i.e., “If you go to college, you will earn $21,100 more per 
year (on average) than if you do not go to college” (Baum, Ma & Payea, 2013).  Alternatively, 
one can frame the same information in terms of the losses one will experience by not going to 
college, i.e., “If you do not go to college, you will earn $21,100 less per year (on average) than if 
you go to college.” While both statements provide the same substantive information, the former 
uses gain framing whereas the latter leverages loss framing. 
 
Secondary Purpose 
A secondary purpose of this study is to assess whether providing any earnings premium 
information, framed as a loss or gain, is likely to induce students to self-report a higher 
likelihood of applying to college as compared to not providing any earnings premium 
information at all. Here, the issue is substantive and not merely a matter of framing. Students 
who receive earnings premium information are given substantively more information upon 
which to base their college application behavior than those who do not. 
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Note on Undermatching 
 Another goal of this study is to determine whether the effects of providing earnings 
premium information (framed as a gain or loss) are especially impactful for high-achieving 
students who may be vulnerable to undermatching, or applying to and enrolling in less selective 
institutions than those for which they are qualified to attend. As such, part of the study involves 
asking students about their likelihood of applying to specific colleges, not just college in general. 
 
Target Population 
Population Characteristics 
The target population of this study includes high school students from the South Side of 
Chicago, a predominantly low-income area of the city. Specifically, students are high school 
sophomores and juniors at three charter schools in the city: (1) Catalyst Maria Charter School, 
located in the Chicago Lawn neighborhood; (2) Chicago International Charter School (CICS) 
Longwood, located in the Washington Heights neighborhood; and (3) UChicago Charter School 
Woodlawn Campus, located in the Woodlawn neighborhood. 
The study focuses on sophomores and juniors because these students are far enough 
along in their high school careers to be thinking about post-high school plans, but not so far 
along (i.e., seniors) that they would have already applied to college. The problem with surveying 
seniors is that, by the time surveys were administered in March 2016, seniors have already 
presumably applied to college. Asking about their likelihood of applying to college after the fact, 
then, could potentially be a confounding factor in the study. 
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School Access 
The study focuses on charter schools because they present fewer regulatory hurdles than 
Chicago Public Schools, which would have required that a Research Review Board (which meets 
only once every six weeks) approve the proposed research study. Charter schools, on the other 
hand, have more flexibility to administer the survey without formal regulatory approval. Finally, 
access to these specific schools was gained through personal referrals to administrators. 
 
Survey Design [See Appendix A for complete survey] 
Randomized Controlled Design 
 Using the Qualtrics Block Randomization feature, students were randomly assigned to 
complete one of three versions of the survey: control, gain frame, or loss frame. This feature not 
only randomly assigns students to one condition as soon as they click the survey link; it also 
ensures that students are evenly distributed among the three conditions. 
 
Selection of Colleges 
 In all three conditions, students were asked about their likelihood of applying to college 
in general, as well as their likelihood of applying to five specific colleges. These include: (1) 
Northwestern University, (2) University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, (3) University of 
Illinois at Chicago, (4) Northeastern Illinois University, and (5) Columbia College Chicago. 
 These five colleges were chosen for two reasons. First, each is classified under a different 
selectivity category according to Barron’s Profile of American Colleges. These categories are, in 
corresponding order with the list above: (1) “Most Competitive,” (2) “Highly Competitive,” (3) 
“Very Competitive,” (4) “Competitive,” and (5) “Less Competitive.” The purpose of including 
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one college from each selectivity category is to analyze whether providing earnings premium 
information has an especially profound effect for certain types of colleges more than others. 
 The second reason these specific colleges were chosen is that they are all located in 
Illinois and, with the exception of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in the 
Chicago metropolitan area. As previous research has shown, geographical proximity is an 
important factor when students are deciding where to apply to and enroll in college (e.g., Eagan 
et al., 2014). A student from the Chicago area is much more likely to apply to a college in 
Chicago than a college across the country, for example. Additionally, four out five of these 
(Northwestern is the exception) are among the seven most commonly enrolled four-year colleges 
for Chicago high school students (Nagaoka, Roderick & Coca, 2009).  
 
Net Cost and Earnings Premium Data 
 When asked about their likelihood of applying to college in general, students in the gain 
and loss conditions were told that the earnings premium of attending college as compared to high 
school graduates is $21,100 per year (Baum, Ma & Payea, 2013). 
 Net cost and earnings premium data for specific colleges was obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Education’s College Scorecard. Average annual net cost information was given 
based on the assumption that students’ household income is in the $0-$30,000 bracket. It should 
be noted, though, that only 36% of households in the neighborhoods studied have a medium 
income of $35,000 or less (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). While the net cost information provided 
could have presumably been based on the assumption that students’ household income is in the 
$30,001-$48,000 bracket, this may have overstated the net cost for certain students. As such, the 
lower bracket was selected. A summary of the average annual net cost data (where the dollar 
amount is rounded to the nearest hundred) for the five schools is shown here in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3: Average Annual Net Cost Information 
School Average Annual Net Cost 
Northwestern University $15,800 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign $8,000 
University of Illinois at Chicago $9,600 
Northeastern Illinois University $14,800 
Columbia College Chicago $26,600 
 
  
Earnings premium data was also retrieved from the College Scorecard. According to the 
website, the average annual salary of workers in the U.S. with only a high school diploma is 
$34,300. For each of the five colleges, the website provides the median earnings of former 
students of that college who received federal financial aid, at 10 years after entering the school. 
To calculate the earnings premium, the difference between these two figures was calculated. A 
summary of the earnings premium data is shown here in Figure 4: 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Average Earnings Premium Information 
School Annual Earnings Premium 
Northwestern University $39,100 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign $31,600 
University of Illinois at Chicago $26,600 
Northeastern Illinois University $11,000 
Columbia College Chicago $7,700 
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 It is perhaps interesting to observe the positive correlation between college selectivity and 
earnings premium. This fact should reaffirm our belief that undermatch is an important problem 
to solve if increasing intergenerational mobility and ameliorating income inequality are part of 
our national policymaking goals. 
 
Admissions Selectivity Information 
 In addition to net cost and earnings premium data, students were also given two metrics 
to gauge admissions selectivity (Barron’s ratings were not shown): acceptance rate and ACT 
interquartile range. These were obtained from U.S. News & World Report and The Princeton 
Review, respectively. The purpose of this was to provide students with a “reality check.” For 
example, a student in the gain condition who sees that the earnings premium associated with 
attending Northwestern is $39,100 may be very tempted to report that he is “extremely likely” to 
apply. But if that student has poor academic credentials, then it is most likely not in his best 
interest to apply to Northwestern. Without providing this reality check, it is possible that survey 
responses would be overly enthusiastic and findings of the study would therefore be misleading. 
 
Note on Simplification 
 The information conveyed by this survey is complex by nature. Asking high school 
students to process net cost, earnings premium, and selectivity information, and then make a 
decision about their likelihood of applying, is no easy task. Furthermore, out of respect for 
students’ time, the survey was designed to take no longer than 10 minutes to complete. 
 As such, several efforts were made to simplify the survey-taking procedure for students 
and guide their attention appropriately. First, for students in the gain and loss conditions, the 
words “more” and “less,” respectively, were bolded and underlined. Second, when students were 
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asked about specific colleges, they were provided with a table summarizing the selectivity and 
net cost information for all five colleges, not just the one in question. This was to ensure that 
students were making relevant comparisons and not considering any one college in a vacuum. 
That said, the college in question was always highlighted blue in the table. Finally, earnings 
premium and net cost information was rounded to the nearest hundred dollars in all cases. 
 
Background Questions 
 In addition to the randomized controlled portion of the survey, all students regardless of 
condition were also asked several background questions. The first two questions asked what 
students’ post-high school plans are and what, if any, concerns they have when thinking of 
applying to college. As explained in the “Results and Data Analysis” section, the first question 
was primarily used to ensure that students who reported that they planned on taking a job or 
enlisting in the military after high school would not be included in the study. The second 
question was primarily used to determine whether students who are concerned about college cost 
would be especially influenced by the provision of net cost and earnings premium information. 
 At the end of the survey, students were asked several additional background questions 
about what high school they attend, their grade level, ACT score, unweighted GPA, highest level 
of intended math, parental educational attainment, and how invested they feel their parents are in 
their children’s education. 
 
Survey Administration 
Access to administrators at the three target schools was secured in late February and early 
March. Soon thereafter, these administrators communicated with teaching staff, who were 
responsible for administering the surveys.  
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The survey was designed and administered online using Qualtrics. On March 22, 2016, 
the survey link was sent to teachers at all three schools. At various points during the following 
three weeks, teachers sent the survey link to their students, who completed it online. On April 12, 
2016, the survey was closed. 
To incentivize participation in the study, every teacher who administered the survey was 
promised a $20 Amazon gift card. These will be distributed in late May 2016. 
Unfortunately, administrators at UChicago Charter School Woodlawn Campus 
encountered logistical difficulties that prevented them from administering the survey according 
to plan. While the survey link was ultimately given to students on April 10, 2016, very few 
responses were recorded before the survey was closed two days later. 
 
Research Timeline 
February 28, 2016: First contact with Chicago International Charter School (CICS) Longwood 
March 8, 2016: First contact with Catalyst Maria Charter School 
March 8, 2016: IRB initial submission 
March 17, 2016: First contact with UChicago Charter School 
March 18, 2016: IRB submission approved 
March 19, 2016: Parental consent opt-out form sent to schools 
March 22, 2016: Qualtrics survey released to students 
April 10, 2016: Data collection and analysis begins 
April 12, 2016: Survey closed 
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Institutional Review Board Approval Process 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was sought in the event that the findings of 
this study are ever shared in a non-classroom setting. On March 8, 2016, the initial Human 
Subjects Electronic Research Application was submitted to Penn’s Office of Regulatory Affairs. 
 The IRB officer commented that, because the study includes minors under the age of 18, 
parental consent would be required. This requirement was partially voided in accordance with 45 
CFR 46.116(d), which says that parental consent is not necessary when the research involves no 
more than minimal risk to subjects and could not be practicably carried out without a waiver for 
the requirement. Despite this, the IRB submission was approved on March 18, 2016 under the 
condition that all parents receive an opt-out consent form (Appendix C) before the survey was 
given. This was sent to schools on March 19, 2016 and subsequently sent home with students. 
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 Results and Data Analysis 
Background Information 
Survey Completion 
 Between March 22, 2016 and April 12, 2016, 279 survey responses were recorded, 
although not all surveys were fully completed. 
This was lower than the anticipated number of responses due to logistical difficulties that 
prevented administrators at UChicago Charter School Woodlawn Campus from distributing the 
survey link according to plan. Had UChicago been able to administer the survey, this would have 
increased the number of survey responses by approximately 175 students. 
 
Removals 
 While 279 responses were recorded, only 237 students were ultimately included in the 
sample size that was used for data analysis. A total of 42 students were removed from the sample 
size for several reasons explained below. 
Five students did not agree to the consent language provided on the opening page of the 
survey and thus did not complete any of the survey past this point. 
Eighteen students were removed because of their stated post-high school plans. Six 
students reported that they plan on taking a job immediately after high school and 12 students 
reported that they plan on enlisting in the military. To avoid complications with data analysis 
(e.g., students who intend to enlist in the military might report that they are “extremely unlikely” 
to apply to any college), these students were removed from the study. 
Seven students from UChicago Charter School Woodlawn Campus eventually responded 
to the survey, but only after data analysis commenced on April 10, 2016. These students were 
thus removed from the study altogether. 
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Finally, 12 students started the survey but did not fully complete it. Students ended the 
survey at different points. Some completed questions about their likelihood of applying to 
specific colleges but did not answer background questions at the end, while others quit before 
reporting their likelihood of applying. In order to ensure that the dataset was complete, these 
students were removed. 
 
Sample Size Characteristics 
School and Grade Level 
 Of the 237 students included in the study, 145 students (61 percent) were from Chicago 
International Charter School (CICS) Longwood and 92 students (39 percent) were from Catalyst 
Maria Charter School. With respect to grade level, the study included 152 juniors (64 percent) 
and 85 sophomores (36 percent). 
 
Intended Post-High School Plans 
By far the most common intended post-high school plan is to attend four-year or two-year 
college; 205 students (86 percent) recorded this option. Next, 27 students (11 percent) reported 
being undecided. Finally, five students (2 percent) said they intend to enroll in a technical 
college after high school. 
 
Concerns When Applying to College 
The most commonly reported concern that students have when applying to college is the 
high cost of attendance; 169 students (71 percent) recorded this option. Next, 76 students (32 
percent) reported being concerned about attending college far from home. Next, 72 students (30 
percent) reported being concerned about the difficulty of the application process. Next, 59 (25 
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percent) said they are worried that they would not do well in college. Finally, in the free response 
field, seven students (3 percent) expressed some sort of concern about whether their academic 
qualifications would prevent them from getting into the college of their choice. 
 
Academic Credentials 
Students were asked about their academic performance on three dimensions: ACT score, 
unweighted high school GPA, and highest level of math they intend to take in high school. 
Given that the survey was administered to sophomores and juniors, very few had taken 
the ACT and received their scores by the time of survey administration. In fact, only 21 students 
(9 percent) of students reported an ACT score. As a result, this was not used as a metric of 
academic achievement during data analysis. 
All students, however, reported their unweighted high school GPA (out of 4.0). The 
average reported GPA was 2.97. The standard deviation was 0.56. Although the two schools may 
have slightly different grading standards, GPA was used as the primary metric of academic 
achievement due to the fact that it was reported by all students. 
Finally, students were asked about the highest level of math they intend to take before 
graduating high school. Precalculus/trigonometry was the most common response; 75 students 
(32 percent) recorded this option. Next, 68 students (29 percent) reported calculus. Next, 63 
students (27 percent) reported algebra. Finally, 31 students (13 percent) reported geometry. 
 
Parents’ Educational Attainment 
When asked about their mother’s highest level of educational attainment, 74 students (31 
percent) reported a college degree or higher, 52 students (22 percent) said they did not know, 51 
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students (22 percent) reported some college, 35 students (15 percent) reported a high school 
degree, and 25 students (11 percent) reported no high school degree. 
The overall level of of educational attainment among fathers was slightly lower; 87 
students (37 percent) said they did not know, 52 students (22 percent) reported a high school 
degree, 43 students (18 percent) reported a college degree or higher, 29 students (12 percent) 
reported no high school degree, and 26 students (11 percent) reported some college. 
 
Parents’ Belief in Importance of Education 
When students were asked how much their parents care about their children’s education, 
213 students (90 percent) reported that their parents care a lot, 17 students (7 percent) reported 
that their parents care somewhat, five students (2 percent) reported that their parents do not care 
much, and two students (1 percent) reported that their parents do not care at all. Given that the 
vast majority of students reported that their parents care a lot, the data collected from this 
question was not used during the analysis. 
 
Results of Randomized Controlled Portion (All Students) 
Random Assignment 
 Students were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: control, gain, or loss. In 
total, 75 students were assigned to the control condition, 80 to the gain condition, and 82 to the 
loss condition. While Qualtrics assigned an equal number of students to each of the three 
conditions, the reason that the sample size here is not evenly distributed is that 42 students were 
removed from the study. 
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Internal Validity 
 To ensure that composition of each of the three groups was representative of the total 
sample size of 237 students, chi-squared tests were performed for several characteristics: (1) 
whether students were concerned about college cost, (2) high school, (3) grade, (4) mother’s 
education level, and (5) father’s education level. The purpose of this was to ensure that, for 
example, a disproportionate number of students concerned about cost were not assigned to the 
gain condition as compared to the loss condition. 
 The full results of the chi-squared tests are shown in Appendix D. A summary of the 
results is shown here in Figure 5: 
Figure 5: Sample Representativeness (All Students) 
  Chi-square value Significance 
Cost Concern 1.462 0.481 
High School 0.423 0.809 
Grade 0.105 0.949 
Mother’s Education 6.321 0.611 
Father’s Education 10.483 0.233 
  
Given that the p-values of all five characteristics are much larger than 0.05, this indicates 
that there are no statistically significant differences between the three groups along these 
dimensions. As such, the three groups are representative of the total sample size and the study 
has internal validity. 
 
Coding 
 Students were asked to report their likelihood of applying to various colleges (and college 
in general) on a five point Likert scale that used the following language: “Extremely likely,” 
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Somewhat likely,” “Neither likely nor unlikely,” “Somewhat unlikely,” and “Extremely 
unlikely.” For the purposes of data analysis, these responses were coded numerically. 
“Extremely likely” was coded as 5, “Somewhat likely” was coded as 4, “Neither likely nor 
unlikely” was coded as 3, “Somewhat unlikely” was coded as 2, and “Extremely unlikely” was 
coded as 1. 
 
College (General) 
 The mean reported likelihood of applying to college was 4.56 in the control, 4.31 in the 
gain, and 4.34 in the loss condition. None of the differences were statistically significant. The 
fact that the mean likelihood of applying in the control condition was higher than in the gain and 
loss conditions is curious, but the lack of statistical significance should prevent us from jumping 
to conclusions based on this finding.  A summary of the descriptive data and one-way ANOVA 
post-hoc test is shown here in Figure 6: 
 
 
Figure 6: College (General) [All Students] 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 4.5600 .77529 
Gain .24750 .191 
Loss .21854 .269 
Gain 4.3125 .85082 
Control -.24750 .191 
Loss -.02896 .976 
Loss 4.3415 .99653 
Control -.21854 .269 
Gain .02896 .976 
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Northwestern University 
The mean reported likelihood of applying to Northwestern University was 3.01 in the 
control, 3.96 in the gain, and 3.74 in the loss condition. The difference between the control and 
gain conditions was statistically significant, as was the difference between the control and loss 
conditions. The difference between the gain and loss conditions, however, was not significant. A 
summary is shown here in Figure 7: 
 
Figure 7: Northwestern University (All Students) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.0133 1.26804 
Gain -.94917 .000 
Loss -.73057 .000 
Gain 3.9625 .98654 
Control .94917 .000 
Loss .21860 .442 
Loss 3.7439 1.15268 
Control .73057 .000 
Gain -.21860 .442 
 
 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
The mean reported likelihood of applying to the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign was 3.51 in the control, 3.88 in the gain, and 3.60 in the loss condition. None of the 
differences were statistically significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 8: 
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Figure 8: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (All Students) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.5067 1.01839 
Gain -.36833 .083 
Loss -.09089 .856 
Gain 3.8750 1.05991 
Control .36833 .083 
Loss .27744 .226 
Loss 3.5976 1.12062 
Control .09089 .856 
Gain -.27744 .226 
 
 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
The mean reported likelihood of applying to the University of Illinois at Chicago was 
3.76 in the control, 3.79 in the gain, and 3.80 in the loss condition. None of the differences were 
statistically significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 9: 
 
 Figure 9: University of Illinois at Chicago (All Students) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.7600 .99784 
Gain -.02750 .985 
Loss -.04488 .959 
Gain 3.7875 .98974 
Control .02750 .985 
Loss -.01738 .994 
Loss 3.8049 1.05922 
Control .04488 .959 
Gain .01738 .994 
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Northeastern Illinois University 
The mean reported likelihood of applying to Northeastern Illinois University was 3.64 in 
the control, 3.56 in the gain, and 3.51 in the loss condition. None of the differences were 
statistically significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 10: 
 
 
Figure 10: Northeastern Illinois University (All Students) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.6400 1.19277 
Gain .07750 .897 
Loss .12780 .742 
Gain 3.5625 .97881 
Control -.07750 .897 
Loss .05030 .953 
Loss 3.5122 1.08005 
Control -.12780 .742 
Gain -.05030 .953 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Columbia College Chicago 
The mean reported likelihood of applying to Columbia College Chicago was 3.55 in the 
control, 3.30 in the gain, and 3.12 in the loss condition. None of the differences were statistically 
significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 11: 
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Figure 11: Columbia College Chicago (All Students) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.5467 1.33855 
Gain .24667 .458 
Loss .42472 .099 
Gain 3.3000 1.17355 
Control -.24667 .458 
Loss .17805 .652 
Loss 3.1220 1.33694 
Control -.42472 .099 
Gain -.17805 .652 
 
 
 
Results of Randomized Controlled Portion (High-Achieving Students) 
Definition of “High-Achieving” Students 
Existing literature (e.g., Hoxby & Avery, 2013) typically defines “high-achieving” 
students as those with a GPA of 3.70 or higher. However, defining it as such for the purposes of 
this study would have limited the sample size to only 34 students. Therefore, “high-achieving” 
students here are defined as those with a GPA of 3.50 or higher. In doing so, the sample size is 
slightly expanded to include 50 students. 
 
Random Assignment 
 As in the previous analysis, students were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
control, gain, or loss. Of the 50 students included in this analysis, 18 were assigned to the control 
condition, 16 to the gain condition, and 16 to the loss condition. 
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Internal Validity 
As before, five separate chi-squared tests were performed to ensure that composition of 
each of the three groups was representative of the total sample size of 237 students. A summary 
of the results is shown here in Figure 12 (the full results can be found in Appendix D): 
 
Figure 12: Sample Representativeness (GPA 3.5+) 
  Chi-square value Significance 
Cost Concern 2.287 0.319 
High School 0.625 0.732 
Grade 0.112 0.946 
Mother’s Education 5.122 0.744 
Father’s Education 5.250 0.731 
  
Given that the p-values of all five characteristics are much larger than 0.05, this indicates 
that there are no statistically significant differences between the three groups along these 
dimensions. As such, the three groups are representative of the total sample size and this portion 
of the analysis has internal validity. 
 
College (General) 
 Among students with a GPA of 3.50 or higher, the mean reported likelihood of applying 
to college was 4.94 in the control, 4.81 in the gain, and 4.75 in the loss condition. None of the 
differences were statistically significant. As before, the fact that the mean likelihood of applying 
in the control condition was higher than in the gain and loss conditions is curious, but the lack of 
statistical significance should give us pause. A summary of the descriptive data and one-way 
ANOVA post-hoc test is shown here in Figure 13 (the full results can be found in Appendix B): 
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Figure 13: College (General) [GPA 3.5+] 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 4.9444 .23570 
Gain .13194 .554 
Loss .19444 .284 
Gain 4.8125 .40311 
Control -.13194 .554 
Loss .06250 .881 
Loss 4.7500 .44721 
Control -.19444 .284 
Gain -.06250 .881 
 
 
 
Northwestern University 
 The mean reported likelihood of applying to Northwestern University was 3.22 in the 
control, 4.25 in the gain, and 4.06 in the loss condition. The difference between the control and 
gain conditions was statistically significant, while the other two differences were not. A 
summary is shown here in Figure 14: 
Figure 14: Northwestern University (GPA 3.5+) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.2222 1.30859 
Gain -1.02778 .050 
Loss -.84028 .133 
Gain 4.2500 1.06458 
Control 1.02778 .050 
Loss .18750 .905 
Loss 4.0625 1.34009 
Control .84028 .133 
Gain -.18750 .905 
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 The mean reported likelihood of applying to the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign was 3.78 in the control, 4.31 in the gain, and 3.44 in the loss condition. None of the 
differences were statistically significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 15: 
 
 
Figure 15: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (GPA 3.5+) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.7778 1.26284 
Gain -.53472 .352 
Loss .34028 .651 
Gain 4.3125 .79320 
Control .53472 .352 
Loss .87500 .078 
Loss 3.4375 1.20934 
Control -.34028 .651 
Gain -.87500 .078 
 
 
 
 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
 The mean reported likelihood of applying to the University of Illinois at Chicago was 
4.00 in the control, 4.00 in the gain, and 4.13 in the loss condition. None of the differences were 
statistically significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 16: 
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Figure 16: University of Illinois at Chicago (GPA 3.5+) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 4.0000 1.02899 
Gain .00000 1.000 
Loss -.12500 .949 
Gain 4.0000 1.15470 
Control .00000 1.000 
Loss -.12500 .952 
Loss 4.1250 1.36015 
Control .12500 .949 
Gain .12500 .952 
 
 
Northeastern Illinois University 
 The mean reported likelihood of applying to Northeastern Illinois University was 3.78 in 
the control, 3.56 in the gain, and 3.69 in the loss condition. None of the differences were 
statistically significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 17: 
Figure 17: Northeastern Illinois University (GPA 3.5+) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.7778 1.35280 
Gain .21528 .866 
Loss .09028 .975 
Gain 3.5625 .96393 
Control -.21528 .866 
Loss -.12500 .955 
Loss 3.6875 1.30224 
Control -.09028 .975 
Gain .12500 .955 
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Columbia College Chicago 
 The mean reported likelihood of applying to Columbia College Chicago was 3.61 in the 
control, 3.44 in the gain, and 3.25 in the loss condition. None of the differences were statistically 
significant. A summary is shown here in Figure 18: 
Figure 18: Columbia College Chicago (GPA 3.5+) 
Condition Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Comparison 
Condition 
Mean 
Difference Sig. 
Control 3.6111 1.41998 
Gain .17361 .932 
Loss .36111 .737 
Gain 3.4375 1.26326 
Control -.17361 .932 
Loss .18750 .925 
Loss 3.2500 1.52753 
Control -.36111 .737 
Gain -.18750 .925 
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Discussion 
Qualitative Analysis 
Effects of Providing Net Cost and Earnings Premium Information 
In general, we find that very few of the differences between the control, gain, and loss 
conditions are statistically significant. This is likely due to relatively small sample size and, as a 
result, low statistical power of the study. 
That said, three of the differences were indeed significant: (1) control vs. gain for 
Northwestern (all students), (2) control vs. loss for Northwestern (all students), and (3) control 
vs. gain for Northwestern (high-achieving students). These findings, while not the primary aim 
of this study, are nonetheless encouraging. Without average earnings premium information, 
students may believe that Northwestern is not worth applying to because it will cost too much, 
the investment will not be worthwhile, it is too hard to get in, or for other reasons.  
When given earnings premium information framed as a gain (in the case of all students 
and high-achieving students) or loss (in the case of all students, but not high-achieving students), 
however, students reported a significantly higher likelihood of applying to Northwestern. It 
should be noted that, for high-achieving students, the reason that the difference between the 
control and loss conditions was not significant is likely due to small sample size. Given a larger 
sample size, it is reasonable to expect that the findings of the analysis of high-achieving students 
would match those in the analysis of all students. 
These findings are important because they show that, for the most selective institutions 
(Northwestern falls under the “Most Competitive” category according to Barron’s), there may be 
an especially large information gap between what students think net costs and average earnings 
premiums are, and what they actually are. Moreover, this study shows that “pushing” this 
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information directly to students, as opposed to having them “pull” the information for 
themselves, makes a difference. All of the cost and earnings premium information contained in 
this survey is widely available online (the Department of Education’s College Scorecard, in 
particular), but mere availability does not mean that all students will receive and process this 
information. Pushing the information to students as they are thinking about their college options 
thus may reduce cognitive barriers and induce more students to apply. 
While this finding is certainly encouraging, it is also not especially novel. For example, 
Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013) have shown that when low-income students in Toronto were 
exposed to information about the benefits of college attendance and were invited to use a 
financial aid calculator, they reported significantly higher expected returns, lower concerns about 
cost, and greater likelihood of applying to college. Similarly, Jensen (2010) surveyed students in 
the Dominican Republic and found that students’ perceived returns to schooling are quite low 
despite high measured returns. When students were given information about the measured 
returns, they reported increased perceived returns several months later. 
Therefore, while these findings are not novel per se, they are still meaningful. For high-
achieving students in particular, the effects of providing net cost and earnings premium 
information are profound. High-achieving students in the control condition reported a 3.22 
average likelihood of applying to Northwestern, while those in the gain condition averaged 4.25. 
If part of the aim of this study is to encourage more low-income, high-achieving students to 
apply to selective colleges, then an increase of more than a full point should give us cause for 
optimism. 
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Effects of Loss Framing 
There were four instances in which the reported likelihood of applying in the loss 
condition was greater than in the gain condition. These were: (1) college in general (all students), 
(2) University of Illinois at Chicago (all students), (3) University of Illinois at Chicago (high-
achieving students), and (4) Northeastern Illinois University (high-achieving students). 
In all cases, though, the difference between the reported likelihood of applying in the gain 
condition versus the loss condition was not statistically significant. This is likely due to the 
study’s relatively small sample size, as previously discussed. That said, it is not clear whether the 
gain or loss frame would be more effective given a larger sample size (or whether there would be 
a difference at all). In any case, we conclude that the hypothesis of this study – that providing 
students with earnings premium data framed as a loss will induce greater reported likelihood of 
applying to college than information framed as a gain – cannot be accepted or rejected. 
 
Additional Considerations 
 It is potentially worthwhile to examine whether additional subsets of the total sample size 
have varying reported likelihoods of applying. First, it is possible that students who list the high 
cost of college as one of their concerns will be especially receptive to the net cost and earnings 
premium information. For all students and only high-achieving students, though, we find there 
are no significant differences. Figures 19 and 20 summarize the findings, where the number 
outside the parentheses is the likelihood of applying among students concerned about cost, and 
the number inside the parentheses is the likelihood of applying among students in the entire 
sample size. 
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Figure 19: Likelihood of Applying Among Students with Cost Concerns (All Students) 
 College (General) Northwestern University 
Control 4.58 (4.56) 3.02 (3.01) 
Gain 4.33 (4.31) 4.02 (3.96) 
Loss 4.34 (4.34) 3.64 (3.74) 
 
Figure 20: Likelihood of Applying Among Students with Cost Concerns (GPA 3.5+) 
 College (General) Northwestern University 
Control 4.92 (4.94) 3.50 (3.22) 
Gain 4.79 (4.81) 4.43 (4.25) 
Loss 4.77 (4.75) 3.92 (4.06) 
 
It is also possible that students from higher socioeconomic status (where parental 
educational attainment level serves as a proxy of SES) are more receptive to net cost and 
earnings premium information. Here, higher SES is defined as having at least one parent with a 
college degree or higher (88 out of 237 students in the total sample size). Figures 21 and 22 show 
the results. 
Figure 21: Likelihood of Applying Among Students with Higher SES (All Students) 
 College (General) Northwestern University 
Control 4.85 (4.56) 3.08 (3.01) 
Gain 4.39 (4.31) 4.40 (3.96) 
Loss 4.44 (4.34) 3.68 (3.74) 
 
Figure 22: Likelihood of Applying Among Students with Higher SES (GPA 3.5+) 
 College (General) Northwestern University 
Control 5.00 (4.94) 2.40 (3.22) 
Gain 4.78 (4.81) 4.44 (4.25) 
Loss 4.71 (4.75) 4.00 (4.06) 
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We find that, for all students as well as just high-achieving students, there are generally 
no significant differences between students with higher SES and the total sample size. The few 
seemingly large discrepancies should be attributed to very small sample size. For example, the 
fact that high-achieving, higher SES students in the control condition report an average 2.40 
likelihood of applying to Northwestern is concerning at first, until we realize that this an average 
of only five students. 
 
Explanation of Failed Hypothesis 
The hypothesis cannot be accepted, which may be surprising (and disappointing) at first 
glance. There is, however, a potential explanation for why the hypothesis failed, and it lies in a 
concept known as reference dependence, which stems from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
original prospect theory. 
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) show that how a person assesses the outcome of a choice is 
often determined as much by its contrast with a reference point as by intrinsic taste for the 
outcome itself. This is known as having reference dependent preferences. Camerer, Babcock, 
Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) providence evidence of this phenomenon in an unusual setting: 
the working habits of New York City cab drivers. They find that, in a given day, cab drivers 
typically work only as many hours as they need to in order to hit a daily income target they have 
set for themselves. Once they hit the income target, they typically quit for the day, ignoring 
opportunities to make even more money on especially profitable days, like when it is raining. 
This behavior contradicts what standard economic theory predicts, but is consistent with a model 
of reference dependent decision making. The decision to stop working has more to do with the 
cab driver’s reference point (i.e., his daily income target) than it does with his intrinsic taste for 
the outcome itself (i.e., to earn more money). 
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Pope and Schweitzer (2011) provide similar evidence of reference dependency and, more 
specifically, loss aversion. They note that, in golf, the par value of a hole actually makes for a 
very salient reference point. Shooting one stroke over par is known as a bogey, while shooting 
one stroke under par is a birdie. Of course, the fewer the strokes, the better. By analyzing over 
2.5 million putts on the PGA Tour, they find that players are more successful when shooting to 
avoid a bogey than when they are shooting to achieve a birdie. In other words, if par is the 
relevant reference point, then players typically invest more focus in order to avoid a loss than 
they do in order to realize a gain. 
The parallel with the findings here may not be intuitively obvious. The students in this 
study come from predominantly low-income communities. Growing up in this environment may, 
over time, lead them to believe that they will earn a similarly low income as adults. In other 
words, this low income level becomes the student’s reference point. The possibility of gaining an 
additional $39,100 more per year by attending Northwestern, then, seems very attractive relative 
to the reference point. For the low-income student, going to Northwestern (or any college at all) 
is equivalent to the golfer who shoots for birdie. 
By contrast, consider a student of much higher socioeconomic status. For this student, 
having a high income is expected; this is his reference point. The possibility of attending 
Northwestern and earning $39,100 more than the average high school graduate, therefore, is not 
especially appealing. After all, this is what he expects to happen. On the other hand, for the high-
income student, not going to Northwestern and not earning $39,100 more than the average high 
school graduate feels like a loss. For the high-income student, not going to Northwestern (or 
college in general) is equivalent to the golfer who shoots to avoid a bogey. 
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All of this suggests that loss framing may have been more effective had the target 
population of this study been high-income students. This is probably true, but what can be done 
about low-income students? Is loss framing a hopeless cause for them? We turn to this question 
in the section entitled “Areas for Further Research.” 
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Study Limitations 
Issues with Experimental Design 
Small Sample Size 
 As previously mentioned, the study suffers greatly from small sample size and, as a 
result, low statistical power. Not only does the full sample only include 237 students, but this is 
split further among three conditions. The result, as we have seen, is that very few (three, to be 
exact) of the differences between conditions are statistically significant. Furthermore, none of the 
differences between gain and loss conditions – the primary focus of this study – are significant. It 
is possible that loss framing is simply an ineffective intervention, but it is also possible that the 
small sample size prevents us from knowing whether or not this is the case. 
 Had UChicago Charter School Woodlawn Campus been able to participate in the study, 
the total sample size would have increased by approximately 175 students, taking the total to 
approximately 400 students. This could have potentially led to more statistically significant 
findings, but it is hard to tell. Only with a much larger sample size could we be more certain. 
 
Students Attend College-Focused Charter Schools 
 While working with charter schools was beneficial in the sense that it meant fewer 
regulatory hurdles, there are potential complications with focusing exclusively on charters. More 
so than traditional public schools, charters typically place extra emphasis on the value of higher 
education. In fact, Booker, Gill, Sass, and Zimmer (2014) show that charter high school 
enrollment in Chicago leads to an 11 percentage point increase in the probability of attending 
college, as compared to traditional public high school enrollment. 
Whereas the college enrollment rate of Chicago Public School students in 2014 was 
approximately 41 percent, the enrollment rates of the three charter schools in this study are 
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significantly higher (Nagaoka, Roderick & Coca, 2009). At Chicago International Charter School 
(CICS) Longwood, 72 percent of graduates in the class of 2014 enrolled in college the following 
fall. At Catalyst Maria Charter School, 44 percent of 2014 graduates enrolled in college (CPS 
2015 School Quality Rating Report). Finally, while UChicago Charter School Woodlawn 
Campus was not included in the study, it is worthwhile to note that the school enrolls 83 percent 
of students in college and has a 100 percent college acceptance rate (UChicago Report). 
The fact that these charter schools constantly emphasize the value of college to their 
students is a potentially confounding factor in the study, particularly as it relates to the difference 
we would observe between the control vs. gain and control vs. loss conditions. If students are 
already well-informed about the benefits of attending college, then receiving earnings premium 
information (framed as a gain or loss) will likely have less of an effect. 
 
Use of Specific Colleges 
Another potential problem with the study’s design is that students were asked to report 
their likelihood of attending specific colleges.While this was an important and perhaps necessary 
feature in order to understand the effects on undermatching, it may have introduced confounding 
factors into the study. For example, a student might report high likeliness of applying to the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign not because of the earnings premium information 
provided, but because he is a fan of the school’s football team. Conversely, another student may 
report low likelihood of applying to Northeastern Illinois University not because of the 
information that is presented, but because she has an older friend who went there and did not 
enjoy the experience. In sum, there are a myriad of potential problems associated with asking 
students about their likelihood of attending specific colleges. One question for future research is, 
assuming we are using stated and not revealed preferences, how do we gauge the effects of 
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undermatch without asking about specific colleges? Perhaps we could ask about the likelihood of 
applying to schools of different selectivity brackets, but the risk here would be a loss of salience. 
 
Stated vs. Revealed Preference 
 Finally, there is the general limitation of using stated preferences (i.e., by using a survey) 
as opposed to revealed preferences. In order to understand how students truly respond to gain vs. 
loss framing, as opposed to how they say they would respond, we would have to run an actual 
field experiment and track their application behavior. Given time constraints and limited 
financial resources, however, this was not practicably feasible. 
 
General Limitations, Results Notwithstanding 
Selection Effect 
Several efforts have been made in recent years to quantify the earnings premium 
associated with attending specific colleges, including the U.S. Department of Education’s 
College Scorecard (used in this study) and The Economist’s 2015 college rankings, among 
others. As Dale and Krueger (2002) demonstrate, however, estimates of earnings premia may be 
biased because selective colleges admit students, in part, based on characteristics that are related 
to future earnings. In other words, saying that the earnings premium associated with attending 
Northwestern is $39,100, for example, overstates the effect that Northwestern itself has on future 
earnings. In all likelihood, students who are admitted to Northwestern in the first place would 
still have high earnings even if they chose to attend a less selective institution.  
While this might suggest that the earnings premium information in this study was 
overstated, this may not be the case completely. This is because the salary data provided by the 
College Scorecard specifically only looks at the median earnings of former students who 
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received federal financial aid, not all students. Furthermore, Dale and Krueger (2002) also show 
that, while the selection effect may skew earnings premium estimates in general, attending a 
selective college has a real effect particularly for low-income students. Whereas the high-income 
student who is admitted to Penn and Penn State will likely be successful regardless of which 
school he chooses to attend, the low-income student may benefit more by choosing Penn. 
  
Importance of College Persistence 
While closing information gaps and minimizing cognitive biases are important insofar as 
they encourage students to apply to college, applying is just one of many steps along the path to 
college completion. Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson (2009) observe that, in the U.S., only 56 
percent of students who enter postsecondary education finish college. Low college persistence is 
especially problematic for low-income students. Whereas 77 percent of high SES college 
graduates finished in four years, only 59 percent of their low SES counterparts did the same. 
This problem is even more profound for low-income students in Chicago. Nagaoka, 
Roderick, and Coca (2009) report that only 45 percent of Chicago graduates who enrolled in a 
four-year college during the year after high school attained a four-year college degree within six 
years. Furthermore, of the seven most popular institutions for Chicago graduates, only two have 
an institutional graduation rate at or above the national average. All to say that, while 
encouraging more low-income students to apply to college – and the right colleges, at that – is an 
important goal, so too is encouraging college persistence. 
 
Falsity of “College for All” Mantra 
 One implication of this study is that applying to more and better colleges is always a 
good thing for low-income students. But this is not necessarily the case. As Carnevale, Smith, 
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and Strohl (2010) project, only a third of jobs in the U.S. economy in 2018 will require a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. Moreover, 27 percent of people with postsecondary licenses or 
certificates – credentials short of an associate’s degree – earn more than the average bachelor’s 
degree recipient (Symonds, Schwartz & Ferguson, 2011). 
 None of this is to say that a college degree is not worth it. Clearly, starting and graduating 
from college is a worthwhile investment in one’s future. But it is not the only path to success. 
For many low-income students, going to college may not be a worthwhile investment at all, and 
can contribute to large amounts of student debt as well as rising loan defaults (e.g., Looney & 
Yannelis, 2015). Community colleges may not be a viable pathway to a bachelor’s degree, either. 
While some students may believe that community college provides an easier entryway to 
ultimately attaining a college degree, Long and Kurlaender (2009) show that students who 
initially begin at a community college are 14.5 percent less likely to complete a bachelor’s 
degree within nine years than those who start at four-year colleges. All of this suggests that the 
“college for all” mantra may not, in fact, always be appropriate. 
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Areas for Further Research 
Interventions Based in Loss Aversion 
Loss Framing of Nonfinancial Information 
At the end of the “Discussion” section, I offered a possible explanation for why the 
hypothesis of this study ultimately failed. The thought is that, because low-income students have 
a low expected earnings reference point to begin with, touting the financial returns of attending 
college is actually more powerful when framed as a gain than when framed as a loss. That is, loss 
aversion may not be all that powerful when subjects’ reference points are already quite low. 
When the reference point is higher, though, loss aversion features more prominently. 
Low-income students may have low reference points when it comes to their expected future 
earnings, but what about other, nonfinancial outcomes associated with attending college? As 
Taylor et al. (2014) as well as Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2009) show, going to college leads to a 
myriad of nonfinancial benefits in addition to higher salary. Among these are higher rates of full-
time employment, lower rates of unemployment, higher self-reported job satisfaction, higher 
self-reported happiness, greater perceived attractiveness in the dating/marriage market, and lower 
divorce rates, and healthier lifestyles. 
The implication for future research is that, while low-income students may have low 
reference points for their expected salaries, it seems unlikely that they have low reference points 
when it comes to all sorts of nonfinancial outcomes. A student growing up on the South Side of 
Chicago hopefully still has high expectations for his job satisfaction, happiness level, and health, 
to name just a few outcomes. If this is the case, then loss aversion will feature more strongly for 
these outcomes than for future earnings. Consider the following statistic: 53 percent of college 
graduates say they are “very satisfied” with their current job, while only 37 percent of high 
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school grads feel the same way (Taylor et al., 2014). Framed relative to one another, the gain 
frame says that college graduates are 16 percent more likely than high school graduates to say 
they are very satisfied with their current job, while the loss frame says that high school graduates 
are 16 percent less likely than college graduates to say they are very satisfied. 
Further research will ideally use a similar design to this study but test students’ 
receptiveness to loss framing of nonfinancial information instead of earnings premia. It seems 
reasonable to expect that this research design would create more of a significant difference 
between the gain and loss frames. 
 
Additional Interventions Based in Behavioral Economics 
Identity Labeling 
 Identity labeling involves explicitly reinforcing a facet of a person’s real or ideal self that 
is linked with the behavior one aims to elicit (Rogers, Fox & Gerber, 2012). The concept behind 
this is that once someone is told he possesses a certain identity, he will want to behave in ways 
that are consistent with that identity in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). 
 One can create an identity label in one of two ways. The first method is to reinforce or 
make salient an identity that a person likely already has. The second method is to induce a label 
that may not already exist, but is conceivable. One study used this second technique in an effort 
to increase voter mobilization. Participants were told to complete a survey about an upcoming 
election. Participants were then told what their responses indicated about their level of civic 
engagement. What they did not know was that the feedback they received had been randomly 
assigned to them. Those in the first condition were labeled as “above average citizens who are 
very likely to vote,” while those in the second condition were labeled as “average citizens with 
an average likelihood of voting.” One week later, the identity labeling technique had a significant 
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effect on voter turnout. In fact, 87 percent of participants in the “above average” condition voted, 
while only 75 percent of those in the “average” condition voted (Tybout & Yalch, 1980). 
 The implication for future research on college access is that we can theoretically prompt 
low-income students to think of themselves as the type of people who would go to college. For 
example, a survey similar to the one above could ask students to what extent they agree with 
statements like, “I am a hardworking student who cares about my education” or, “I think that I 
will attend and graduate from college.” It is likely that many students already agree with these 
statements, in which case the survey would merely reinforce their self-identities. Even if students 
do not agree with the statements, though, we could still give false feedback in order to falsely 
induce an identity label. Of course, we might question the ethics of such an experiment given 
that it involves lying to participants. Regardless, the goal of inducing the identity label would be 
for students to apply to more and better colleges in order to preserve their self-identity and avoid 
cognitive dissonance. 
 
Choice Overload 
 Schwartz (2004) explains that, contrary to popular belief, having more options to choose 
from is not always a good thing. In one study, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) show that consumers 
in a grocery store are more likely to purchase gourmet jams or chocolates, and students are more 
likely to undertake optional class essay assignments, when they are offered a limited array of six 
choices rather than a more extensive array of 24 or 30 choices. Moreover, participants who were 
given only six options reported greater subsequent satisfaction with their selections than those 
who were given more options. “Choice overload,” Schwartz explains, can have a paralyzing 
effect on people’s decision making abilities, and we would actually be better off if we embraced 
voluntary constraints on our freedom of choice. 
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 For high school students, the college application process may be the paradigmatic 
example of choice overload. Students do not just choose from a dozen or two dozen colleges; 
they are forced to choose from literally hundreds. In some cases, this may lead to students feeling 
overwhelmed by choice and to fewer applications submitted. In other cases, it may mean that 
students will feel less sure about their choices even after they have made them. One area for 
additional research would be to test whether constraining students’ college choices to a handful 
of options would lead to more applications submitted or greater subsequent satisfaction with 
choices made. For example, instead of telling students to browse online in order to make a 
decision of where to apply, college counselors could prepare a short list of 10 or 15 schools and 
tell students to choose among these. 
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Conclusion 
 Improving college access for low-income students, particularly high-achievers, is more 
important than ever as the U.S. faces rising income inequality and poor intergenerational 
mobility. In recent years, “nudges” have been proven to effectively influence students’ 
application behavior and encourage them to enroll in selective institutions. This study uses a 
novel premise to build on this existing body of literature. By surveying low-income high school 
students in Chicago, I examine whether loss framing of earnings premium information causes 
students to report greater likelihood of applying to college than gain framing.  
While I ultimately find no significant differences between the gain and loss conditions, 
there are still reasons for optimism. First, the study suffered from a small sample size, and it is 
therefore possible that future iterations of the study would find significant results given a larger 
sample size. Second, while no significant differences were observed between the gain and loss 
conditions, students in both conditions reported greater likelihood of applying to Northwestern 
(the most selective college in the study) as compared to the control. In other words, “pushing” 
earnings premium information to low-income students may make them more likely to apply to 
selective colleges. While this finding is not novel per se, it is important nonetheless. Finally, loss 
framing may prove more effective when students have higher mental reference points for the 
information being conveyed. Future research should use a similar design to determine whether 
loss framing of the nonfinancial benefits of going to college is an effective nudge. 
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Consent Page
The following survey is completely anonymous and optional. If you agree to
participate, you will be asked several questions about your high school
background, post­high school plans, and attitudes towards college.
 
The results will be used for a research study that examines college application
behavior among high school students in the Chicago area. If you have questions
about this study, please contact Benjamin Feis (bfeis@sas.upenn.edu). 
 
Do you agree to participate in this survey?
Condition #1: Control
What are your post­high school plans?
Which of the following factors are you worried about when thinking of applying to
college? (check all that apply)
Yes
No
College (four­year or two­year)
Technical college
Job
Military service
I haven't decided
College is expensive
Distance from home
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How likely are you to apply to college?
Look at the chart below for a minute or two. Then click to the next page.
Look at the information below about Northwestern University.
Applying to college seems complicated
I don't think I would do well in college
I would rather work after high school
Other: 
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Northwestern University?
Look at the information below about the University of Illinois at Urbana­
Champaign.
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to the University of Illinois at
Urbana­Champaign?
Look at the information below about the University of Illinois at Chicago.
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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Given this information, how likely are you to apply to the University of Illinois at
Chicago?
Look at the information below about Northeastern Illinois University.
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Northeastern Illinois
University?
Look at the information below about Columbia College Chicago.
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Columbia College Chicago?
Condition #2: Gain Frame
What are your post­high school plans?
Which of the following factors are you worried about when thinking of applying to
college? (check all that apply)
If you go to college, you will earn $21,100 more per year (on average) than if
you do not go to college.
 
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
College (four­year or two­year)
Technical college
Job
Military service
I haven't decided
College is expensive
Distance from home
Applying to college seems complicated
I don't think I would do well in college
I would rather work after high school
Other: 
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Given this information, how likely are you to apply to college?
Look at the chart below for a minute or two. Then click to the next page.
Look at the information below about Northwestern University.
 
 
If you go to Northwestern University, you will earn $39,100 more per year (on
average) than if you do not go to college.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Northwestern University?
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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Look at the information below about the University of Illinois at Urbana­
Champaign.
 
If you go to the University of Illinois at Urbana­Champaign, you will earn
$31,600 more per year (on average) than if you do not go to college.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to the University of Illinois at
Urbana­Champaign?
Look at the information below about the University of Illinois at Chicago.
 
 
Extremely likely Somewhat likely Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely
Extremely unlikely
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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If you go to the University of Illinois at Chicago, you will earn $26,600 more per
year (on average) than if you do not go to college.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to the University of Illinois at
Chicago?
Look at the information below about Northeastern Illinois University.
 
 
If you go to Northeastern Illinois University, you will earn $11,000 more per year
(on average) than if you do not go to college.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Northeastern Illinois
University?
Look at the information below about Columbia College Chicago.
 
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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If you go to Columbia College Chicago, you will earn $7,700 more per year (on
average) than if you do not go to college.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Columbia College Chicago?
Condition #3: Loss Frame
What are your post­high school plans?
Which of the following factors are you worried about when thinking of applying to
college? (check all that apply)
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
College (four­year or two­year)
Technical college
Job
Military service
I haven't decided
College is expensive
Distance from home
Applying to college seems complicated
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If you do not go to college, you will earn $21,100 less per year (on average) than
if you go to college.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to college?
Look at the chart below for a minute or two. Then click to the next page.
Look at the information below about Northwestern University.
 
I don't think I would do well in college
I would rather work after high school
Other: 
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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If you do not go to college, you will earn $39,100 less per year (on average) than
if you go to Northwestern University.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Northwestern University?
Look at the information below about the University of Illinois at Urbana­
Champaign.
 
 
If you do not go to college, you will earn $31,600 less per year (on average) than
if you go to the University of Illinois at Urbana­Champaign.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to the University of Illinois at
Urbana­Champaign?
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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Look at the information below about the University of Illinois at Chicago.
 
 
If you do not go to college, you will earn $26,600 less per year (on average) than
if you go to the University of Illinois at Chicago.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to the University of Illinois at
Chicago?
Look at the information below about Northeastern Illinois University.
 
 
If you do not go to college, you will earn $11,000 less per year (on average) than
if you go to Northeastern Illinois University.
 
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
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Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Northeastern Illinois
University?
Look at the information below about Columbia College Chicago.
 
 
If you do not go to college, you will earn $7,700 less per year (on average) than
if you go to Columbia College Chicago.
 
 
Given this information, how likely are you to apply to Columbia College Chicago?
Background Questions
What school do you attend?
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
Extremely likely Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor
unlikely
Somewhat
unlikely Extremely unlikely
Catalyst Maria High School
Chicago International Charter School (CICS) ­ Longwood Campus
UChicago Charter School ­ Woodlawn Campus
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What grade are you currently in?
Have you already taken the ACT and received your score?
What was your score on the ACT?
What is your unweighted high school GPA (out of 4.0)?
What is the highest level of math that you plan to take before graduating high
school?
What is your mother's highest level of education?
9th grade
10th grade
11th grade
12th grade
Yes
No
 
 
Calculus
Pre­calculus or trigonometry
Geometry
Algebra
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Powered by Qualtrics
What is your father's highest level of education?
How much would you say your parent(s)/guardian(s) care about your education?
College degree or higher
Some college but did not graduate
High school degree
Did not graduate from high school
I don't know
College degree or higher
Some college but did not graduate
High school degree
Did not graduate from high school
I don't know
My parent(s)/guardian(s) care a lot about my education
My parent(s)/guardian(s) care somewhat about my education
My parent(s)/guardian(s) do not care much about my education
My parent(s)/guardian(s) do not care at all about my education
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University of Pennsylvania 
Office of Regulatory Affairs 
3624 Market St., Suite 301 S 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6006 
Ph: 215-573-2540/ Fax: 215-573-9438 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
(Federalwide Assurance # 00004028) 
18-Mar-2016 
Laura W Perna  
lperna@gse.upenn.edu 
Attn: Benjamin Feis 
bfeis@sas.upenn.edu  
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Laura W Perna 
TITLE : Survey Regarding Behavioral Interventions to Improve College Access 
SPONSORING AGENCY : No Sponsor Number 
PROTOCOL # : 824640 
REVIEW BOARD : IRB #8 
 
 
Dear Dr. Perna: 
 
The above referenced protocol and was reviewed and approved using the expedited procedure set forth in 45 CFR 46.110, category 7, on 
17-Mar-2016. This study will be due for continuing review on or before 16-Mar-2017.  
 
Approval by the IRB does not necessarily constitute authorization to initiate the conduct of a human subject research study. 
Principal investigators are responsible for assuring final approval from other applicable school, department, center or institute review 
committee(s) or boards has been obtained. If any of these committees require changes to the IRB-approved protocol and informed 
consent/assent document(s), the changes must be submitted to and approved by the IRB prior to beginning the research study. 
 
If this protocol involves cancer research with human subjects, biospecimens, or data, you may not begin the research until you have 
obtained approval or proof of exemption from the Cancer Center’s Clinical Trials Review and Monitoring Committee. 
 
The following documents were included in this review: 
-HS ERA Initial Application, confirmation code: cafabbeh, submitted 3/13/16 
-CITI Training Report of Completion for Benjamin Feis, passed 3/9/15 
-Response Cover Letter, uploaded 3/17/16 
-Survey, version date 3/7/16 
-IRB Vulnerable Populations: Children Form, uploaded 3/7/16 
-Parental Opt-Out Form, uploaded 3/13/16 
 
The IRB reviewed and approved the Subpart D review as per Federal Regulations 45 CFR 46.404 (FDA 50.51), as the research was 
determined to be no greater than minimal risk. The IRB determined that permission of one parent is sufficient and that adequate 
provisions are made for soliciting permission via an opt-out process (the only documented permission will be those parents who do 
not want their child to participate). The IRB has determined that assent must be obtained from subjects and appropriately 
documented.  
 
When enrolling subjects at a site covered by the University of Pennsylvania's IRB, a copy of the IRB approved informed consent form with 
the IRB approved from/to stamp must be used unless a waiver of written documentation of consent has been granted. 
 
If you have any questions about the information in this letter, please contact the IRB administrative staff. Contact information is available 
at our website: http://www.upenn.edu/IRB/directory. 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IRB Administrator  
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Dear Parent/Guardian, 
 
During the week of Monday, March 21st, your son/daughter may complete a short online survey 
(10 minutes or less) about college access and his/her attitudes towards college. This survey is 
completely ​optional​ and  ​anonymous​. 
 
The results will be used for a research study that examines college application behavior among 
high school students in the Chicago area. 
 
If you DO NOT wish your child to participate in this survey, please complete this form. 
 
Student Name: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Student School: ____________________________________ Grade: ___________________ 
 
Parent/Guardian Name (please print): ____________________________________________ 
 
Parent/Guardian Signature: ___________________________________ Date: ____________ 
 
Reason(s) for not participating: 
 
IRB Approval from 3/17/16 to 3/16/17
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Cost Concern (All Students) 
 
Descriptives 
 
Cost Concern 
Total No Yes 
Condition Control 23 52 75 
Gain 19 61 80 
Loss 26 56 82 
Total 68 169 237 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.462 2 .481 
Likelihood Ratio 1.490 2 .475 
N of Valid Cases 237   
 
 
 
 
High School (All Students) 
 
Descriptives 
 
School 
Total Catalyst CICS 
Condition Control 31 44 75 
Gain 29 51 80 
Loss 32 50 82 
Total 92 145 237 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .423 2 .809 
Likelihood Ratio .424 2 .809 
N of Valid Cases 237   
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Grade (All Students) 
Descriptives 
 
Grade 
Total Junior Sophomore 
Condition Control 47 28 75 
Gain 52 28 80 
Loss 53 29 82 
Total 152 85 237 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .105 2 .949 
Likelihood Ratio .105 2 .949 
N of Valid Cases 237   
 
 
 
Mother’s Education (All Students) 
Descriptives 
 
Mother’s Educational Attainment 
Total 
College 
Degree 
or Higher 
Some 
College 
High 
School 
Degree 
Did Not 
Graduate 
From HS 
I Don’t 
Know 
Condition Control 23 20 9 11 12 75 
Gain 25 15 14 8 18 80 
Loss 26 16 12 6 22 82 
Total 74 51 35 25 52 237 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.321 8 .611 
Likelihood Ratio 6.311 8 .612 
N of Valid Cases 237   
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Father’s Education (All Students) 
Descriptives 
 
Father’s Educational Attainment 
Total 
College 
Degree 
or Higher 
Some 
College 
High 
School 
Degree 
Did Not 
Graduate 
From HS 
I Don’t 
Know 
Condition Control 13 10 15 12 25 75 
Gain 9 9 23 10 29 80 
Loss 21 7 14 7 33 82 
Total 43 26 52 29 87 237 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.483 8 .233 
Likelihood Ratio 10.496 8 .232 
N of Valid Cases 237   
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Cost Concern (GPA 3.5+) 
 
Descriptives 
 
Cost Concern 
Total No Yes 
Condition Control 6 12 18 
Gain 2 14 16 
Loss 3 13 16 
Total 11 39 50 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 2.287 2 .319 
Likelihood Ratio 2.277 2 .320 
N of Valid Cases 50   
 
 
 
 
High School (GPA 3.5+) 
 
Descriptives 
 
School 
Total Catalyst CICS 
Condition Control 7 11 18 
Gain 6 10 16 
Loss 8 8 16 
Total 21 29 50 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .625 2 .732 
Likelihood Ratio .622 2 .733 
N of Valid Cases 50   
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Grade (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 
Grade 
Total Junior Sophomore 
Condition Control 11 7 18 
Gain 9 7 16 
Loss 9 7 16 
Total 29 21 50 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .112 2 .946 
Likelihood Ratio .112 2 .945 
N of Valid Cases 50   
 
 
 
Mother’s Education (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 
Mother’s Educational Attainment 
Total 
College 
Degree 
or Higher 
Some 
College 
High 
School 
Degree 
Did Not 
Graduate 
From HS 
I Don’t 
Know 
Condition Control 4 7 1 2 4 18 
Gain 8 3 2 1 2 16 
Loss 7 3 1 2 3 16 
Total 19 13 4 5 9 50 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.122 8 .744 
Likelihood Ratio 5.194 8 .737 
N of Valid Cases 50   
 99
Father’s Education (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 
Father’s Educational Attainment 
Total 
College 
Degree 
or Higher 
Some 
College 
High 
School 
Degree 
Did Not 
Graduate 
From HS 
I Don’t 
Know 
Condition Control 2 1 2 4 9 18 
Gain 4 2 2 2 6 16 
Loss 5 0 3 2 6 16 
Total 11 3 7 8 21 50 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.250 8 .731 
Likelihood Ratio 6.029 8 .644 
N of Valid Cases 50   
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APPENDIX E 
Full Results and One­Way ANOVA Post Hoc Tests 
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College (General) 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 75 4.5600 .77529 .08952 4.3816 4.7384 1.00 5.00 
Gain 80 4.3125 .85082 .09512 4.1232 4.5018 1.00 5.00 
Loss 82 4.3415 .99653 .11005 4.1225 4.5604 1.00 5.00 
Total 237 4.4008 .88519 .05750 4.2876 4.5141 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain .24750 .14179 .191 -.0869 .5819 
Loss .21854 .14095 .269 -.1139 .5510 
Gain Control -.24750 .14179 .191 -.5819 .0869 
Loss -.02896 .13863 .976 -.3560 .2980 
Loss Control -.21854 .14095 .269 -.5510 .1139 
Gain .02896 .13863 .976 -.2980 .3560 
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Northwestern University 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 75 3.0133 1.26804 .14642 2.7216 3.3051 1.00 5.00 
Gain 80 3.9625 .98654 .11030 3.7430 4.1820 1.00 5.00 
Loss 82 3.7439 1.15268 .12729 3.4906 3.9972 1.00 5.00 
Total 237 3.5865 1.20289 .07814 3.4326 3.7404 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain -.94917* .18305 .000 -1.3809 -.5174 
Loss -.73057* .18196 .000 -1.1598 -.3014 
Gain Control .94917* .18305 .000 .5174 1.3809 
Loss .21860 .17897 .442 -.2035 .6407 
Loss Control .73057* .18196 .000 .3014 1.1598 
Gain -.21860 .17897 .442 -.6407 .2035 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 75 3.5067 1.01839 .11759 3.2724 3.7410 1.00 5.00 
Gain 80 3.8750 1.05991 .11850 3.6391 4.1109 1.00 5.00 
Loss 82 3.5976 1.12062 .12375 3.3513 3.8438 1.00 5.00 
Total 237 3.6624 1.07553 .06986 3.5248 3.8001 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain -.36833 .17176 .083 -.7735 .0368 
Loss -.09089 .17074 .856 -.4936 .3118 
Gain Control .36833 .17176 .083 -.0368 .7735 
Loss .27744 .16793 .226 -.1187 .6735 
Loss Control .09089 .17074 .856 -.3118 .4936 
Gain -.27744 .16793 .226 -.6735 .1187 
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University of Illinois at Chicago 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 75 3.7600 .99784 .11522 3.5304 3.9896 1.00 5.00 
Gain 80 3.7875 .98974 .11066 3.5672 4.0078 1.00 5.00 
Loss 82 3.8049 1.05922 .11697 3.5721 4.0376 1.00 5.00 
Total 237 3.7848 1.01269 .06578 3.6552 3.9144 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain -.02750 .16343 .985 -.4130 .3580 
Loss -.04488 .16247 .959 -.4281 .3383 
Gain Control .02750 .16343 .985 -.3580 .4130 
Loss -.01738 .15979 .994 -.3943 .3595 
Loss Control .04488 .16247 .959 -.3383 .4281 
Gain .01738 .15979 .994 -.3595 .3943 
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Northeastern Illinois University 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 75 3.6400 1.19277 .13773 3.3656 3.9144 1.00 5.00 
Gain 80 3.5625 .97881 .10943 3.3447 3.7803 1.00 5.00 
Loss 82 3.5122 1.08005 .11927 3.2749 3.7495 1.00 5.00 
Total 237 3.5696 1.08163 .07026 3.4312 3.7080 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain .07750 .17438 .897 -.3338 .4888 
Loss .12780 .17335 .742 -.2811 .5367 
Gain Control -.07750 .17438 .897 -.4888 .3338 
Loss .05030 .17050 .953 -.3519 .4525 
Loss Control -.12780 .17335 .742 -.5367 .2811 
Gain -.05030 .17050 .953 -.4525 .3519 
 
 
 106
Columbia College Chicago 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 75 3.5467 1.33855 .15456 3.2387 3.8546 1.00 5.00 
Gain 80 3.3000 1.17355 .13121 3.0388 3.5612 1.00 5.00 
Loss 82 3.1220 1.33694 .14764 2.8282 3.4157 1.00 5.00 
Total 237 3.3165 1.29088 .08385 3.1513 3.4816 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain .24667 .20648 .458 -.2404 .7337 
Loss .42472 .20525 .099 -.0594 .9089 
Gain Control -.24667 .20648 .458 -.7337 .2404 
Loss .17805 .20188 .652 -.2981 .6542 
Loss Control -.42472 .20525 .099 -.9089 .0594 
Gain -.17805 .20188 .652 -.6542 .2981 
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College (General) [GPA 3.5+] 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 18 4.9444 .23570 .05556 4.8272 5.0617 4.00 5.00 
Gain 16 4.8125 .40311 .10078 4.5977 5.0273 4.00 5.00 
Loss 16 4.7500 .44721 .11180 4.5117 4.9883 4.00 5.00 
Total 50 4.8400 .37033 .05237 4.7348 4.9452 4.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain .13194 .12661 .554 -.1745 .4384 
Loss .19444 .12661 .284 -.1120 .5009 
Gain Control -.13194 .12661 .554 -.4384 .1745 
Loss .06250 .13028 .881 -.2528 .3778 
Loss Control -.19444 .12661 .284 -.5009 .1120 
Gain -.06250 .13028 .881 -.3778 .2528 
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Northwestern University (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 18 3.2222 1.30859 .30844 2.5715 3.8730 1.00 5.00 
Gain 16 4.2500 1.06458 .26615 3.6827 4.8173 1.00 5.00 
Loss 16 4.0625 1.34009 .33502 3.3484 4.7766 1.00 5.00 
Total 50 3.8200 1.30447 .18448 3.4493 4.1907 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain -1.02778* .42835 .050 -2.0644 .0089 
Loss -.84028 .42835 .133 -1.8769 .1964 
Gain Control 1.02778* .42835 .050 -.0089 2.0644 
Loss .18750 .44077 .905 -.8792 1.2542 
Loss Control .84028 .42835 .133 -.1964 1.8769 
Gain -.18750 .44077 .905 -1.2542 .8792 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 18 3.7778 1.26284 .29765 3.1498 4.4058 1.00 5.00 
Gain 16 4.3125 .79320 .19830 3.8898 4.7352 3.00 5.00 
Loss 16 3.4375 1.20934 .30233 2.7931 4.0819 1.00 5.00 
Total 50 3.8400 1.14927 .16253 3.5134 4.1666 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain -.53472 .38328 .352 -1.4623 .3929 
Loss .34028 .38328 .651 -.5873 1.2679 
Gain Control .53472 .38328 .352 -.3929 1.4623 
Loss .87500 .39440 .078 -.0795 1.8295 
Loss Control -.34028 .38328 .651 -1.2679 .5873 
Gain -.87500 .39440 .078 -1.8295 .0795 
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University of Illinois at Chicago (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 18 4.0000 1.02899 .24254 3.4883 4.5117 1.00 5.00 
Gain 16 4.0000 1.15470 .28868 3.3847 4.6153 1.00 5.00 
Loss 16 4.1250 1.36015 .34004 3.4002 4.8498 1.00 5.00 
Total 50 4.0400 1.15987 .16403 3.7104 4.3696 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain .00000 .40639 1.000 -.9835 .9835 
Loss -.12500 .40639 .949 -1.1085 .8585 
Gain Control .00000 .40639 1.000 -.9835 .9835 
Loss -.12500 .41817 .952 -1.1370 .8870 
Loss Control .12500 .40639 .949 -.8585 1.1085 
Gain .12500 .41817 .952 -.8870 1.1370 
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Northeastern Illinois University (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 18 3.7778 1.35280 .31886 3.1050 4.4505 1.00 5.00 
Gain 16 3.5625 .96393 .24098 3.0489 4.0761 1.00 5.00 
Loss 16 3.6875 1.30224 .32556 2.9936 4.3814 1.00 5.00 
Total 50 3.6800 1.20272 .17009 3.3382 4.0218 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain .21528 .42077 .866 -.8030 1.2336 
Loss .09028 .42077 .975 -.9280 1.1086 
Gain Control -.21528 .42077 .866 -1.2336 .8030 
Loss -.12500 .43297 .955 -1.1728 .9228 
Loss Control -.09028 .42077 .975 -1.1086 .9280 
Gain .12500 .43297 .955 -.9228 1.1728 
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Columbia College Chicago (GPA 3.5+) 
Descriptives 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control 18 3.6111 1.41998 .33469 2.9050 4.3172 1.00 5.00 
Gain 16 3.4375 1.26326 .31582 2.7644 4.1106 1.00 5.00 
Loss 16 3.2500 1.52753 .38188 2.4360 4.0640 1.00 5.00 
Total 50 3.4400 1.38741 .19621 3.0457 3.8343 1.00 5.00 
 
One-Way ANOVA Post Hoc Test 
(I) Condition (J) Condition 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Gain .17361 .48388 .932 -.9974 1.3447 
Loss .36111 .48388 .737 -.8099 1.5322 
Gain Control -.17361 .48388 .932 -1.3447 .9974 
Loss .18750 .49791 .925 -1.0175 1.3925 
Loss Control -.36111 .48388 .737 -1.5322 .8099 
Gain -.18750 .49791 .925 -1.3925 1.0175 
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